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Appellants Donald M. Dudley and Ruf, Inc. ("Buyers") 
respectfully submit this Reply Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
VR Utah, Inc. d/b/a VR Business Brokers ("Broker"), and Icelandic 
Investment, Inc. and Robert Johnson ("Sellers") enforcing the 
fraudulently induced Purchase Transaction Agreement. The evidence 
established that both Broker and Sellers knew about yet failed to 
disclose the existence of the litigation pending against the entity 
purchased by Buyers. The evidence further established that Broker 
advised and persuaded Sellers to affirmatively misrepresent to 
Buyers that there was no pending litigation. Thus, the trial court 
erred in enforcing this fraudulently induced agreement and its 
provisions. 
The trial court erred in ruling that a limited release 
provision contained in the fraudulently induced Purchase 
Transaction Agreement protected Broker from its affirmative 
fraudulent conduct. First, the Release provision was subject to 
rescission as it was contained in an admittedly fraudulently 
induced agreement. Second, the language of the release provision 
does not exculpate Broker from liability for fraudulent conduct. 
Finally, the release provision was void as a matter of law because 
public policy does not permit a covenant of immunity which will 
protect a person against his own fraud. 
The trial court further erred in find that Buyers did not rely 
on the misrepresentation that there was no pending litigation 
1 
against the entity they were purchasing. Buyers' reliance was 
expressly contemplated, intended and acknowledged in the terms of 
the Purchase Transaction Agreement itself. Moreover, there was 
evidence that there being no litigation was extremely important to 
Buyers and that they would not have entered into the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement or signed the corresponding promissory notes 
if that warranty had not been made. Finally, Broker owed Buyers a 
duty of honesty and full disclosure which they breached when they 
failed to disclose (and encouraged Sellers to affirmatively 
misrepresent) the pending litigation. Such fraudulent omission 
does not require a showing of reliance under Utah law and the trial 
court's ruling to the contrary was error. 
The trial court further erred in ruling that Buyers were not 
damaged by the fraud. First, as a matter of procedure, the trial 
court erred in relying on this basis as this issue was not raised 
until Broker's reply memorandum. Second, there was substantial 
evidence of damages incurred by Buyers, including: Buyers were 
damaged as the value of the entity they purchased which was subject 
to a lawsuit seeking in excess of $88,000 was obviously less than 
the same entity with no pending litigation as represented; Buyers 
were damaged as they lost their funding source which was contingent 
on their being no pending litigation against the entity being 
purchased; and Buyers were damaged when they were named as parties 
to the pending litigation and forced to obtain representation and 
defend themselves in the litigation. 
2 
Finally, the trial court erred in enforcing a Default 
provision and finding that Sellers, having admitted making an 
intentional misrepresentation to induce Buyers to enter into the 
Purchase Transaction Agreement, were not liable to Buyers because 
Buyers failed to notify Sellers of their "right to cure" the 
default. First, the Default provision is unenforceable as it was 
contained in the Purchase Transaction Agreement and induced by 
fraud. Second, as a matter of law Sellers cannot hide behind the 
Default provision to protect themselves from their own fraud. 
Third, the language of the Default provision did not apply to 
misrepresentations of existing facts and, in any event, it could 
not be cured. Finally, even if the Default provision applied, 
Sellers did not cure the default within thirty (30) days as 
required under that provision and that is fatal to their claim.1 
In sum, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on 
Buyers' claims for fraud in the inducement and negligent 
misrepresentation against both Sellers and Broker. Moreover, given 
the fraudulently induced agreement, the trial court also erred in 
granting summary judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of 
Sellers and Broker, both of which were based on the fraudulently 
induced agreement. Accordingly, the trial court's rulings granting 
summary judgment in favor of Sellers and Broker should be reversed 
and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
1
 The undisputed evidence established that Sellers had 
actual notice yet failed to terminate the litigation for more than 
eighteen (18) months after the parties entered into the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement, and more than eight (8) months after 
receiving Buyers' notice of rescission. 
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I. BROKERS1 ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ARE WITHOUT MERIT AND 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Broker makes three (3) arguments in support of the trial 
court's summary judgment in its favor: (1) The Release of 
Liability set forth in Article XX of the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement Is Not Subject To Rescission And Exculpates Broker From 
Its Misconduct; (2) Buyers failed to present evidence of reliance 
upon the Sellers' misrepresentation in which the Broker 
participated and upon the omission by Broker; and (3) Buyers 
failed to present evidence of damages. These arguments are 
addressed in turn. 
1. The Release Of Liability Contained In The Fraudulently 
Induced Purchase Transaction Agreement Cannot Protect 
Broker From Its Own Misconduct And, Moreover, It Is 
Subject To Rescission. 
The record evidence before the trial court established that at 
the time of the Purchase Transaction the Sellers knew about the 
pending Associated Factors Lawsuit and not only failed to disclose 
that litigation but affirmatively represented that there was no 
such litigation. See Brief of Appellant at pp. 3-6. The evidence 
further established that the Sellers discussed the existence of the 
Associated Factors Lawsuit with Broker yet Broker did not disclose 
that litigation to Buyers and, in fact, Broker persuaded Sellers 
not to disclose the pendency of the litigation. Id. 
Broker now argues that despite the record evidence of its 
intentional fraudulent conduct, summary judgment in its favor was 
proper because of the Release provision set forth in Article XX of 
4 
the Purchase Transaction Agreement. That argument is fundamentally 
flawed in several respects. 
A. The Release Provision Is Part And Parcel Of A 
Fraudulently Induced Contract That Is Subject To 
Rescission And, Therefore, The Release Is Void. 
First of all, Broker cannot escape liability for its 
misconduct based on a provision set forth in a fraudulently induced 
agreement. Because of the material misrepresentation, the entire 
Purchase Transaction Agreement is voidable and subject to 
rescission. E.g. , American Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361, 
363 (Utah 1951); Conder v. A.L. Williams &Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 
634, 639 (Utah App. 1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has the 
option to elect to rescind the transaction and recover the purchase 
price or to affirm the transaction and recover damages")(citing 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980)); Perkins v. 
Coombs, 769 P. 2d 269, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (same and noting the 
choice of remedy belongs to defrauded party); Mecham v. Benson, 
590 P.2d 304, 307-308 (Utah 1979)(same). Under the same 
principles, the Release provision contained in the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement is also void. E.g., Lamb v. Bangard, 525 
P. 2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974) ("A contract limitation on damages or 
remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of 
fraud.")(citations omitted); Ong Intern. (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah 1993) (releases which are part 
of a scheme to defraud or contained in a fraudulently induced 
5 
contract are likewise voidable).2 Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in granting Broker's motion for summary judgment enforcing 
the Release provision. 
B. The Release Provision Language, Even If It Was Not Void 
Because It Was Induced By Fraud, Does Not Encompass 
Broker's Fraudulent Conduct. 
Second, the language of the Release provision does not 
exculpate Broker from its fraudulent conduct. That language as set 
forth in Article XX of the Purchase Transaction Agreement is as 
follows: 
By signing this Agreement, BUYER hereby acknowledges that 
BUYER is relying solely on BUYER'S own inspection of the 
business and the representations of SELLER and not on [Broker] 
with regard to the prior operating history of the business, 
the value of the assets being purchased and all other material 
facts of SELLER in making this offer. BUYER acknowledges that 
Broker has not verified, and will not verify, the 
representations of SELLER and should any representations be 
untrue, BUYER agrees to look solely to SELLER for relief and 
to indemnify Broker and hold Broker harmless in connection 
with all losses and damages caused BUYER thereby. 
Under this provision the Broker was not required to verify the 
representations made by the Seller and Buyers agreed not to require 
the Broker to do so. It does not follow, however, that because the 
2
 Broker's reliance on this Court's opinion in Otsuka is 
misplaced. In Otsuka, a party raised a fraud defense to a claim 
based on a forbearance agreement which was entered into subsequent 
to the agreement induced by fraud. This Court ruled that the fraud 
defense must be raised against the document upon which a party is 
being sued. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, 
Inc. , 937 P.2d 1274, 1278-1279 (Utah App. 1997) (fraud is not 
defense to forbearance agreement entered into without fraud and 
subsequent to the fraudulently induced agreement). In the present 
case, however, the release agreement is set forth in the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement, the very agreement that was induced by 
fraud. Accordingly, the Release provision is subject to rescission 
and the trial court's summary judgment rulings to the contrary must 
be reversed. 
6 
Broker is not verifying the Sellers1 representations that the 
Broker can advise and encourage Sellers to misrepresent material 
facts as Broker did in this case. No buyer reading this language 
in a purchase agreement would understand he was releasing Broker 
from intentional misrepresentations by the Sellers which resulted 
from Broker!s advice and insistence. Yet the evidence establishes 
that is what happened here. 
Moreover, the language cannot be read to relieve Broker from 
its duty as an agent under Utah law owed to Buyers to act honestly, 
ethically and competently, e.g., Duaan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 1239, 
1248 (Utah 1980) (citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 
802, 805 (1962)), and a prospective buyer certainly would not read 
the Release provision that way. 
Thus, even if the Release provision was not subject to 
rescission because it is contained in a fraudulently induced 
agreement, Broker is not relieved from liability by the Release 
provision contained in that agreement and summary judgment was 
improperly entered against Buyers. 
C. The Release Provision Cannot Limit Broker1s Liability For 
Its Misconduct. 
Third, the Release provision cannot exculpate Broker from 
liability as a matter of public policy. The Utah Supreme Court 
ruled: 
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will 
protect a person against his own fraud on the grounds of 
public policy. A contract limitation on damages or remedies 
is valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud. 
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Oner Int'l (USA). Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 
1993) (emphasis added) (citing Lamb v. Banaart. 525 P. 2d 602, 608 
(Utah 1974) ) .3 The 1 aw simply does not allow a party to a 
contract to obtain a contractual provision by fraud and then seek 
to hide behind the protection of the provision when challenged with 
the fraud. Yet the trial court expressly ruled that under the 
Release provision of Article XX "[Buyer] expressly relieved 
[Broker] of any legal duties arising from the described conduct, 
i.e., seller's representations or misrepresentations." [R605-606] . 
That ruling is directly contrary to Utah 1 aw. Thus# even if the 
Purchase Transaction Agreement was not subject to rescission and 
even if the language of the Release provision could be construed to 
encompass Broker's fraudulent conduct, the trial court erred in 
finding that the Release provision relieved Broker of liability for 
its own fraud or for the Sellers' fraud which Broker expressly 
encouraged and assisted. The trial court's order granting Broker's 
motion for summary judgment must be reversed. 
2. There Was More Than Sufficient Evidence Of Buyers' 
Reliance On The Admitted Misrepresentation Regarding 
Pending Litigation To Defeat Summary Judgment. 
Broker next argues that the Buyers did not rely on the 
misrepresentation that there was no pending litigation against 
3
 It should be noted that the Utah Supreme Court in Ong 
refused to enforce a broad release provision that released "any and 
all claims, demands, rights of action or causes of action, whether 
known or unknown, howsoever arising, which in any way are based 
upon or related to [defendant's] association with the [plaintiff] ." 
Ong, 850 P.2d at 451. Clearly if the Court refused to relieve a 
party from its own fraud under such a broadly worded provision, the 
very narrow Release provision in the case at bar cannot relieve 
Broker of its liability for its misconduct. 
8 
Seller Icelandic at the time of the Purchase Transaction Agreement. 
The record evidence before the trial court, however, established 
Buyers' reliance. For instance, the parties expressly contemplated 
and intended such reliance. Article IX of the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement expressly states that: 
"BUYER may rely on the same to enter into this transaction, 
each and all of the following: . . . That there are no known 
. . . litigation proceedings against SELLER, which have arisen 
in connection with its conduct of the business. 
[R15-16] Thus, it was known by both Broker and the Sellers that 
Buyers were relying on the representations of Sellers that there 
was no known litigation. Armed with this knowledge, Broker chose 
to advise and persuade Sellers to not disclose the pending 
litigation and, moreover, despite its fiduciary obligation to 
Buyers, the Broker also chose not to disclose the pending 
litigation. Under the express language of the Purchase Transaction 
Agreement, therefore, the Buyers demonstrated that they relied on 
the misrepresentation and summary judgment was improperly granted. 
In addition, there was other record evidence that the lack of 
outstanding litigation against Sellers was extremely important to 
Buyers and that they would not have entered into the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement or signed the promissory notes if that 
warranty was not in the agreement. [E.g., R4-7, 432-440, 866-867 
at %% 4-6 & 12] . Moreover, it is common sense that someone 
purchasing a business will rely on a representation that there is 
no pending litigation against that entity. That conclusion is 
bolstered in this case by the fact that the lack of outstanding 
9 
litigation was so critical to Buyers that it was expressly 
addressed in the Purchase Transaction Agreement. 
In spite of this clear evidence that Buyers relied on the 
representation that there was no litigation pending against Seller, 
Broker argues that the Release provision somehow precludes a 
finding of reliance. To the contrary, that provision bolsters 
Buyers' position that it relied on Sellers' misrepresentation made 
at Broker's behest: 
. . . BUYER is relying solely on BUYER'S own inspection of the 
business and the representations of SELLER. . . . 
That language expressly states, as does the portion of the 
agreement wherein the misrepresentation regarding litigation is set 
forth, that Buyers are relying on this representation (the false 
representation Brokers induced) in entering into the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement. Based on the foregoing, it was error for 
the trial court to find as a matter of law that Buyers did not rely 
on Sellers' misrepresentation that there was no pending litigation, 
which misrepresentation was expressly encouraged and assisted by 
Broker, and the trial court's ruling must be reversed. 
Finally, under Utah law Broker can be held liable for its 
failure to disclose the known litigation to Buyers. Broker, as 
agent of Buyers, owed Buyers duties of honesty, good faith and 
disclosure. E.g., Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 
1980) (citing Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 802, 805 
(1962); Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 881-882 (Utah 
1983) . Despite these duties, Broker not only encouraged Seller to 
affirmatively misrepresent there was no pending litigation, Broker 
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failed to disclose the litigation to Sellers. Broker's fraudulent 
nondisclosure of this material fact is actionable and, as a matter 
of law, reliance need not be shown. E.g., First Sec. Bank of Utah 
N.A. v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 
1990)(actionable fraud based on nondisclosure requires only a 
showing that the omitted fact was material); McDougal v. Weed, 945 
P. 2d 175, 179 (Utah App. 1997) (concealment of material facts is 
fraudulent concealment). Thus, even if one were to disregard the 
record evidence of Buyers1 reliance on the 
misrepresentation/omission, the Broker's concealment of the 
existence of the litigation was actionable and precluded the 
summary judgment entered by the trial court. 
3 . The Trial Court Erred In Ruling That, As A Matter Of Law, 
Buyers Were Not Damaged By The Fraud. 
Broker next argues that the trial court's summary judgment was 
proper because Buyers failed to show they had been damaged as a 
result of the misrepresentation. That argument is flawed in 
several respects. 
A. Brokerfs Summary Judgment Motion Did Not Raise The Issue 
Of Damages And, Therefore, It Was Error For The Trial 
Court To Grant Summary Judgment On That Basis. 
First, the element of damages was not raised in Broker's 
motion for summary judgment [R382-384] or its initial memorandum 
supporting that motion [R385-397]; therefore, it was improper for 
the trial court to rule against Buyers on this element. The only 
element of Buyers' fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims 
discussed by Broker in its summary judgment motion prior to its 
reply was the element of reliance. [R394-396] Not only was 
11 
Broker's summary judgment motion not based on a claimed lack of 
damages, there was no mention of damages in the statement of facts 
purportedly supporting the motion. The motion clearly was based on 
the Release provision, not on any claimed lack of damages. Given 
that the damages issue was not raised and Broker set forth no 
evidence that Buyers were not damaged, Buyers were not obligated to 
produce any evidence of damages and the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling to the contrary is error. E.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(b) & (e) ; Parrish v. Lavton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 
1975)(party opposing summary judgment can rest on pleadings when 
moving party does not support motion with affidavits); Gadd v. 
Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984)(counter-affidavits not required 
when moving party does not file affidavits supporting motion). 
After Buyers responded to Broker's summary judgment motion 
that did not raise the issue of damages, Broker's reply argued for 
the first time that summary judgment was proper as Buyers failed to 
introduce evidence of damages. A basis for summary judgment cannot 
be raised for the first time on reply, however, and the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment on the damages issue. 
B. There Was More Than Sufficient Evidence Of Damage To 
Buyers To Defeat The Broker's Summary Judgment Motion. 
Second, there was sufficient evidence of damages to defeat the 
motion in any event. In opposing a summary judgment motion, it is 
not necessary to establish a damages claim with precision and a 
party need only demonstrate they can produce evidence that would 
reasonably support a finding in their favor on this issue. 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1991); 
12 
Kranz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991) . Such evidence 
is clearly established in this case. The value of an entity being 
sued for more than $88,000 (more than the purchase price agreed to 
by Buyers) plus punitive damages is far less than the same entity 
with no pending litigation. Such difference in value between the 
thing as represented and the thing as it actually exists are 
damages that clearly support fraud and negligent misrepresentation 
claims. E.g., Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 835 P.2d 992, 994-997 
(Utah App. 1992)(rescission based on fraudulent misrepresentation 
proper where surroundings of entity purchased misrepresented to 
appear more desirable than they actually were); Ong, 850 P.2d at 
453,-455 (rescission based on fraud proper where business entity as 
existed worth less than entity as represented); Prudential Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291, 292-293 (Utah 
1980)(rescission of insurance agreement proper where applicant 
failed to disclose material fact regarding prior insurance which 
changed risk to insurance company); Callister v. Millstream 
Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 663-664 (Utah App. 1987) (rescission 
proper where property conveyed had encumbrance contrary to sellers' 
representation). 
Buyers were further damaged as the record evidence before the 
trial court established that Buyers lost their funding source as a 
direct and proximate result of this fraud as Buyers' financing for 
the Purchase Transaction was contingent on there being no pending 
litigation against the Seller Icelandic, and when it came to light 
that there was pending litigation despite the representation to the 
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contrary, the lender withdrew future funding. [R5-7, 853-854, 864-
870, 1167-1172]4 Further, Buyers incurred damage when, in 
September, 1991, Buyer Ruf, Inc. was added as a defendant in the 
Associated Factors Lawsuit and had to retain counsel and defend 
itself in that substantial litigation. [R437-438, 830, 868, 895-
899] Clearly the foregoing demonstrates there was sufficient 
evidence of damages to preclude summary judgment even had Broker 
properly raised the issue in its summary judgment motion. Billings 
v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1991); Kranz v. 
Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991). Thus, the trial court's 
entry of summary judgment against Buyers on their fraud in the 
inducement claim was error. 
II. SELLERS' ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ARE WITHOUT MERIT AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Sellers make two (2) arguments in support of the trial court's 
summary judgment in their favor: (1) Buyers failed to present 
evidence of damages resulting from the admitted material 
misrepresentation; and (2) The Default provision contained in the 
4
 Broker argues that this evidence should not be considered 
because it was filed in response to Sellers' motion for summary 
judgment which was briefed subsequent to Broker's motion. This 
evidence is properly considered with respect to Broker's motion, 
however, as the court's summary judgment ruling in favor of Broker 
was not final and was "subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Moreover, 
such evidence should have been considered in connection with 
Buyers' Motion for New Trial which was filed for the express 
purpose of having the trial court consider damages evidence which 
Buyers could not previously present given Broker's raising of the 
damages issue in its reply memorandum. Thus, this evidence should 
have been considered and it precludes the trial court's summary 
j udgment rulings. 
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fraudulently induced Purchase Transaction Agreement was not voided 
by the fraud and it insulates Sellers from their fraud and bars 
Buyers1 claims. These arguments are addressed in turn. 
1. There Was More Than Sufficient Evidence Of Damage To 
Buyers1 To Defeat Sellers' Summary Judgment Motion. 
To defeat a summary judgment motion, a party need not 
establish a damages claim with precision. Instead, they need only 
demonstrate they can produce evidence that would reasonably support 
a finding in their favor on this issue. Billings v. Union Bankers 
Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1991); Kranz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 
352, 353 & 356 (Utah 1991). As set forth fully, supra at pp. 12-
14, there was clear evidence that the Buyers were damaged as a 
result of the undisclosed lawsuit seeking more than $88,000 plus 
punitive damages against the business being purchased. Buyers were 
damaged by the diminished value of the entity subjected to 
litigation, they were damaged when they were named as parties and 
forced to retain counsel and defend themselves in that litigation, 
and Buyers were damaged when they lost their financing for the 
purchase and continued operation of the business. 
In response to this abundant evidence, Sellers argue that 
summary judgment was proper as Buyers failed to "prove a material 
loss of profits", citing Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 
P.2d 988, 989 (1954) .5 Sellers statement of the law, however, is 
5
 Sellers repeatedly cite to evidence in support of their 
argument that was not part of the record before the trial court. 
In fact, Sellers1 brief does not have a single factual cite to any 
record evidence before the trial court and, pursuant to Rule 24(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, such evidence cannot be 
considered on appeal. 
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incorrect. The Davis case involves materiality of a 
misrepresentation (not damages) and has absolutely no relevance to 
this case as it is undisputed that the misrepresentation/omission 
was of a material fact. It appears as though Sellers are not 
arguing about whether Buyers were damaged (which was clearly 
established by the evidence before the trial court), but argue 
instead that Buyers failed to show precisely the amount of those 
damages. As set forth above, damages need not be established with 
absolute certainty or precision, but only that damage has occurred. 
That requirement is clearly satisfied by the fact that the Buyers 
lost a funding source, had to hire counsel to oppose the 
undisclosed litigation, and received an entity embroiled in 
litigation which obviously was worth less than the value of the 
entity as represented. Such damages are sufficient as a matter of 
law in a fraud or negligent misrepresentation case. E.g. , 
Schuhman, 835 P. 2d at 994-997 (rescission based on fraudulent 
misrepresentation proper where surroundings of entity purchased 
misrepresented to appear more desirable than they actually were); 
Oner, 850 P. 2d at 453,-455 (rescission based on fraud proper where 
business entity as existed worth less than entity as represented) ; 
Mardanlou, 601 P. 2d at 292-293 (insurance agreement subject to 
rescission simply because insured failed to disclose prior 
insurance cancellation on application); Callister v. Millstream 
Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 663-664 (Utah App. 1987) (rescission 
proper where property conveyed had encumbrance contrary to sellers' 
representation). Thus, summary judgment in favor of Sellers both 
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on Buyers1 claims and against Buyers on the promissory notes was 
improper and should be reversed. 
2. The Default Provision Did Not Apply To A Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation And, Even If It Did, The Undisputed 
Evidence Showed That Sellers Did Not Cure Default For 
Several Years. 
Sellers1 remaining argument on appeal is that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment enforcing the promissory notes 
and against Buyers' claims under the Default provision set forth in 
Article VIII of the Purchase Transaction Agreement.6 In essence, 
the Sellers' logic is that a party to a contract containing a 
default provision can effectively make unlimited misrepresentations 
to induce the other party to enter into the contract so long as 
those misrepresentations are either undetected or cured as provided 
in the default provision. Such an unjust result is contrary to law 
and the trial court erred in finding that this Default provision 
was enforceable, applicable, and a bar to Buyers' claims. 
A. The Default Provision Is Not Enforceable As The Agreement 
Was Induced By Fraud. 
As a matter of law, a contract induced by a fraudulent 
misrepresentation of existing material fact is subject to 
rescission at the election of the defrauded party. E.g., American 
6
 That provision provides in pertinent part: 
In the event any party to this Agreement defaults on any term 
or provision incorporated herein, including any provision of any 
Exhibit attached hereto, the non-defaulting party shall give the 
defaulting party a written notice requiring that such default be 
cured within thirty (30) days after receipt of said written 
notice. . . . After such period, the non-defaulting parties may 
take the remedies set forth in this Agreement and any attachments 
hereto. . . . [R15] 
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Scale Mfg. Co. v. Zee, 235 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1951); Conder v. 
A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) ("plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to elect to 
rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm 
the transaction and recover damages") (citing Ducran v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980)) . The undisputed evidence establishes 
that Buyers were fraudulently induced to enter into the Purchase 
Transaction by Appellees' misrepresentations regarding pending 
litigation and that Buyers, upon learning of the fraud, immediately 
issued a written notice of rescission. Thus, the Purchase 
Transaction Agreement (including the Default provision) was voided 
and unenforceable. 
Additionally, the Sellers sought (and the trial court obliged) 
the enforcement and protection of a contractual provision which was 
obtained by an affirmative and material misrepresentation that no 
litigation existed. A party to a contract cannot obtain a 
contractual provision by fraud and then seek to hide behind the 
protection of the provision when challenged with the fraud. As the 
Utah Supreme Court has expressly stated: 
The law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will 
protect a person against his own fraud on the grounds of 
public policy. A contract limitation on damages or 
remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or 
proof of fraud. 
Ong Int'l (USA), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 
1993)(emphasis added). 
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B. The "Default" Could Not Be Cured And The Default 
Provision Is Inapplicable. 
Even if the law were ignored and the obligations and 
limitations set forth in the Default provision were somehow 
enforceable, the Default provision has no application as the fraud 
could not be cured and the provision was obviously not intended to 
apply to misrepresentations made to induce the other party to enter 
into the agreement.7 The "default" was the existence of 
litigation against the Seller at the time of the Purchase 
Transaction. This default simply could not be cured -- the 
litigation was in existence at the time of purchase and that fact 
could not be changed. Moreover, to rule that the Default provision 
allowed Sellers an opportunity to cure their misrepresentation 
would emasculate the affirmative representations made in the 
contract.8 Accordingly, the Default provision allowing the cure 
of a default is not applicable as Sellers could not cure this 
defect brought about by their blatant fraud. 
7
 As the language of the Default provision indicates, the 
provision was only intended to apply to defaults that arose after 
the execution of the agreement (i.e., "[i]n the event any party to 
this Agreement defaults on any term or provision") . Thus, the 
Default provision is inapplicable. 
8
 Moreover, it would be bad public policy as recognized by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the Oner case. Such a ruling would allow 
contracting parties to make unlimited misrepresentations to induce 
another party to enter into an agreement and then require the 
defrauded party to discover the fraud, provide written notice, and 
then only hold the defrauder liable if they could not cure the 
default within a month. This result would be unjust, illogical and 
would eviscerate the value of any representations made in a 
contract. 
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C. The Default Provision Does Not Provide Protection For 
Sellers As They Had Notice Of The Default. 
Even if the Default provision were enforceable and the 
existence of litigation was something that could be cured, the 
Sellers failed to cure the "default" as provided under Article VIII 
and summary judgment was improper. The purpose of the Default 
provision was to provide the defaulting party with notice so they 
could effectively cure the default within 3 0 days. The undisputed 
evidence in this case establishes, however, the Sellers had actual 
notice of the "default" (i.e. , the pending litigation) at the time 
they signed the Purchase Transaction Agreement. Despite this 
actual notice the Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled for 
more than a year and a half after the parties entered into the 
Purchase Transaction Agreement. Moreover, even if actual knowledge 
of the default does not satisfy the technical requirement of the 
Default provision, the undisputed evidence shows that on September 
23, 1991 Buyers sent Sellers a written notice of rescission of the 
Purchase Transaction identifying the outstanding litigation as the 
basis. [R438, 628, 868] Clearly this letter satisfied the written 
notice requirement of the Default provision as it placed Sellers on 
notice of the default. Despite this notice, however, the 
Associated Factors Lawsuit was not settled until June, 1992, more 
than eight (8) months after the notice. Thus, even if the Default 
provision were somehow enforceable and the default was curable, the 
undisputed evidence shows that Sellers did not "cure" the default 
within the thirty (3 0) period as required under the Default 
provision. Such failure is fatal to Sellers' claim. Callister v. 
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Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah App. 1987)("Even 
assuming plaintiffs were entitled to additional time to clear the 
encumbrance, it is fatal to their position that they did not 
actually clear it.11)9. Thus, the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Sellers was reversible error on this basis as 
well. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BUYERS' MOTION TO AMEND 
TO ADD CLAIM OF RESCISSION AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Buyers' initial Brief sets forth at pages 33-36 the reasons 
the trial court erred in denying Buyers' motion to amend to add a 
claim of rescission and motion for new trial. Nothing in 
Appellees' responsive briefs alters the conclusion of that analysis 
that neither of those motions should have been denied.10 Thus, 
Buyers will not burden the Court by reciting those arguments again 
and instead incorporates them by reference. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Buyers' 
claims for fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation 
against both Sellers and Broker. Moreover, given the fraudulently 
induced agreement, the trial court also erred in granting summary 
9
 Not only did Sellers fail to cure the "default" for more 
than 18 months after they affirmatively misrepresented there was no 
pending litigation, they presented no evidence that they could cure 
it within the 3 0-days under the Default provision. Even more 
telling, however, is the fact that they did not terminate the 
litigation within the 3 0-day period. Thus, their reliance on the 
Default provision is misplaced. Id. 
10
 In fact, neither of the Appellees now seem to dispute 
that Buyers had a claim for rescission that was decided by the 
trial court. 
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judgment against Buyers on the counterclaims of Sellers and Broker, 
both of which were based on the fraudulently induced agreement. 
Accordingly, the trial court's rulings granting summary judgment in 
favor of Sellers and Broker should be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2&~ day of October, 1998. 
ATKIN & LILJA, P.C. 
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